kw: book reviews, nonfiction, espionage, memoirs
When I was an active member of a Toastmasters club, an elderly woman joined. I will call her Carol. Members are encouraged to prepare a 5-minute speech every month or two. Carol did so. Sometimes her speeches were quite memorable. She and her husband were retired from the U.S. State Department, and it became clear that they had been spies. I'll paraphrase her most memorable speech in Toastmasters:
"We were sent to Thailand to surveil a Russian team who had obtained a compound at the edge of a rice paddy. We were able to obtain a small house in a row of houses on the other side. We decided to put a listening device under the Russians' house by pushing a pipe through the ground; once it was installed we would push through stiff wires with a microphone at the end. We dug a trench so that we could pound a pipe along, and screw on new sections as needed. We did the pounding only when there was a lot of traffic on a nearby road, using irregular blows to avoid a patterned sound. Late one winter evening, during the rush hour but after dark, the pounding got very hard, but we persisted as long as we dared. When rush hour ended we stopped for the night. In the morning, we looked out, and saw that the pipe must have hit a rock because it was sticking a couple of feet right out of the ground!"
She didn't say what happened next. Later my wife and I met them at a YMCA event, and I asked about it, but she said some secrets still have to be kept. That is our only contact with spies…that we know about.
More recently, both Andrew and Jihi Bustamante worked for the CIA for several years, and then another dozen years or so training security teams. They founded Everyday Spy, teaching spy skills to help individuals deal with more ordinary matters. They have written Shadow Cell: An Insider Account of America's New Spy War. There they tell of their most significant achievement in the CIA, applying the "cell model" that has long been used most successfully by terrorist networks and the spy operations of some countries; I remember reading decades ago about cell networks in America operated by the USSR. If it works, use it! This is the basis of the "new spy war" and it breaks down the overly bureaucratic stovepipe structure that had arisen in the traditional CIA.
Andrew and Jihi had worked, separately and together, in what they call Falcon House, where "Falcon" is code for one of the most secretive and paranoid countries (but not quite on the level of North Korea). At first I thought Falcon is an Islamic country because Arab men adore falconry. But the ease of movement of female CIA operatives nixed that idea. Falcon is probably in Asia; there's no need to speculate further. During their work with Falcon they lived in a nearby country, one with the freedom to come and go.
A foundational characteristic of spycraft is to go unnoticed. Memorable people are more likely to be caught. In this regard, I think Andrew is on the edge of being too memorable; from the description by his wife Jihi, he can be bold and loud, even arrogant. In this generated image (DuckDuckGo running GPT Image 2) several couples are visible. Does one stand out? If one couple were spies, it would probably not be that one.The Bustamantes did not enter Falcon publicly as a couple. They had different roles. He often worked in the field, while she was a target specialist. Another couple, an extremely unmemorable pair, did operate as a couple, with good success. A long section near the end of the book outlines some of Andrew's forays into Falcon, and eventually his almost miraculous escape from capture, more due to bumbling by Falcon officials than his own skills. It ended his usefulness there. But by that time the "shadow cell" had been set up, successfully operating under the principle that only a single person in the Cell could be known to other CIA entities or cells; other cells were set up on the Cell's model once its efficacy became known.
Just as the Bustamantes began operating near and in Falcon, a mole had been detected operating in the CIA, someone who had been "turned" by Falcon's agents. His identity is not revealed in the book, but his eventual discovery and arrest are briefly outlined. While the mole was active, Andrew had to be even more circumspect than usual to avoid exposing the other members of the Cell.
The advice and stories in this book buttressed for me two principles I learned from lectures by police and security trainers: "security by obscurity" and "be a harder target than the next guy". In spy work as in personal security, the opposition isn't perfectly diligent (though in Falcon they come close!), and will often pay more attention to easier prey and sometimes can be distracted.







































